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Much debate and national soul searching has taken place over the value of the Space 
Shuttle which first flew in 1981 and which is currently scheduled to be retired in 2010. 
Originally developed post-Saturn Apollo to emphasize affordability and safety, the reusable 
Space Shuttle instead came to be perceived as economically unsustainable and lacking the 
technology maturity to assure safe, routine access to low earth orbit (LEO). After the loss of 
two crews, aboard Challenger and Columbia, followed by the decision to retire the system in 
2010, it is critical that this three decades worth of human space ifight experience be well 
understood. 
Understanding of the past is imperative to further those goals for which the Space 
Shuttle was a stepping-stone in the advancement of knowledge. There •was significant 
reduction in life cycle costs between the Saturn Apollo and the Space Shuttle. However, the 
advancement in life cycle cost reduction from Saturn Apollo to the Space Shuttle fell far 
short of its goal. This paper will explore the reasons for this shortfall. 
Shortfalls and lessons learned can be categorized as related to design factors, at the 
architecture, element and sub-system levels, as well as to programmatic factors, in terms of 
goals, requirements, management and organization. Additionally, no review of the Space 
Shuttle program and attempt to take away key lessons would be complete without a strategic 
review. That is, how do national space goals drive future space transportation development 
strategies? The lessons of the Space Shuttle are invaluable in all respects - technical, as in 
design, program-wise, as in organizational approach and goal setting, and strategically, 
within the context of the generational march toward an expanded human presence in space. 
Beyond lessons though (and the innumerable papers, anecdotes and opinions published on 
this topic) this paper traces tangible, achievable steps, derived from the Space Shuttle 
program experience, that must be a part of any 2l century initiatives furthering a growing 
human presence beyond earth. 
'Operations Analysis, Modeling and Simulation, Information Technology Directorate, Kennedy Space Center, 
Florida/IT-Cl 
2 Program Manager, Advanced Programs, P.O. Box 7922 / MS RFB 19, AIAA Member. 
AST, Technical Management, Engineering Directorate Design & Development Eng Div Sys Engineering & 
Integration Br, Kennedy Space Center, Florida/NE-D2, AIAA Senior Member. 
Principal Engineer/Scientist, Propulsion Engineering, 5301 Bolsa Avenue / HO 1 3-C3 13, AIAA Associate Fellow. 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
45th AIAA/ASMEJSAEJASEE Joint Propulsion Conference
	 AJAA 2009-5346 
2-5 August 2009, Denver, Colorado
Nomenclature 
ASTP = Apollo Soyuz Test Project 
CPI = Consumer Price Index 
EVM = Earned Value Management 
LEO = Low Earth Orbit 
LPY = Launches per Year 
R&D = Research and Development 
SPST = Space Propulsion Synergy Team 
STS = Space Transportation System
I. Introduction 
The Space Shuttle is a wondrous achievement. It is not the purpose of this paper to second guess the past but 
rather, to learn from the past and move forward. Any technology attempting to open a new frontier will inevitably 
have shortcomings. Later systems with mature technology often forget past systems that helped to understand 
fundamentals. In this respect it is critical to realize that the Space Shuttle was born amidst an environment that 
stressed economics and capabilities - the principal selling point of the Shuttle "Space Transportation System" (STS) 
was to provide an "economical capability for delivering payloads of men, equipment, supplies and other spacecraft 
to and from space by reducing the operating costs an order of magnitude below those of present systems 5". The 
Space Shuttle was born during a dire federal budget situation that would last a decade, a federal budget environment 
where NASA, regardless of the then recent colossal success of the 1969 Moon landing, was to see the same budget 
pressures as other federal agencies. NASA's response as the initial planning years of Shuttle evolved was to turn to 
reusability. It is with this in mind - reusability - that many lessons can be discerned that are as relevant today as 
back then.
II. Looking Back, Saturn to Shuttle 
To understand the lessons of Shuttle it is first necessary to look back to the NASA budgets at a point in time 
when the last lunar exploration capability existed. By 1970 the hand writing on the wall spelled the end of the Saturn 
Apollo program at the same time as the new Shuttle program was being fonnulated. The similarity to the current 
situation, the Shuttle being retired and a new system, Constellation, being developed, is not made lightly or by 
chance. The last "Apollo" mission was in July 1975, the joint Apollo-Soyuz Test project (ASTP) and the "gap" in 
human space flight would then last until April 1981, the first Space Shuttle flight, almost six years later. Selling the 
Shuttle on cost and capabilities was a response to the Saturn Apollo budgets of the time. On this later point of 
budgetary pressures the analogy to the current situation, arising from the loss of Columbia in 2003, would appear to 
draw a difference. On further analysis it will be shown there is still similarity. 
A review of the Saturn Apollo budgets immediately begs the question - was the Shuttle truly a more affordable 
system than Saturn Apollo or was it merely doing less and thus costing less? 
Shown in Figure 1 is an excerpt of the Saturn Apollo budget from 1960 to 19736. Observe the following, with 
the intent of determining a "rough cost per year" to produce the expendable hardware and operate and launch such 
hardware to provide a lunar exploration capability: 
1. The budget peaked two years before the first Moon landing. 
2. The costs on 1971 and 1972 drop significantly as compared to the previous two years. 
3. The system was fully expendable. 
From this it can be surmised that hardware flown any year would have had some actual costs in previous years as 
production lagged the actual delivery, integration, checkout and launch. It is suggested that the use of 1969 budget 
data for Apollo would give a fair estimate of the cost per launch as there were three Lunar and one earth orbit 
launches that year. 
"Space Shuttle, A History of Developing the National Space Transportation System, 2'' Edition, The Beginning 
through STS-75", (1997), Jenkins, Dennis R., pg. 74. 
6 Apollo by the Numbers, A Statistical Reference for the Manned Phase of Project Apollo, (1996), Orloff, Richard 
W., pg. 22.
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Using the values from 1969, where four Saturn V launches, occurred the budget for Apollo was $2.03B 
or about $$506M each flight. Adjusted to 2009 dollars, this would be $3.32B per launch. 
Using a value "between" the 1970 and the 1971 budget would yield: $1,299,907,000 (average, then 
year) which adjusted to 2009 dollars 7 would be $3.75B/launch for a couple of lunar launches per year - 
However, these years did not have any flight hardware production cost included for 1971. 
Using the value of 1971 would yield simply $913,669,000 (then year) which adjusted to 2009 dollars 
would be $5,274,611,100. (i.e., $5.3B/yr for a couple of lunar launches per year or $2.8B/launch. 
However, again this year did not have any flight hardware production cost included. 
Now there are numerous and endless ways in which the prior calculation could be adjusted, refined, diced, 
spliced and debated. Some will yield numbers higher or lower than these notional calculations, but the same valid 
point would likely remain always - The United States federal budget, under numerous pressures, looked to NASA in 
the early 1970's to do more than a couple of lunar launches per year for what were then "space transportation" 
budgets in the rough order of today's human spaceflight space transportation budgets. As significantly, the desire 
was that no space related development again require the levels of peak funding that would add to a total agency level 
that approached 4% of the total federal budget in 19668. Today NASA's budgets stand at about '/2 of a percent of the 
federal budget. 
This begs the question about the Shuttles budgets. To best make this comparison it's important to have a couple 
of snapshots in time. This is because accounting in NASA of what's "in" a programs budget and what's "out" has 
evolved and changed many times over the years. Consider a sample budget from 1994 in what was at the time 
referred to as "pre"-full-cost (but which was pretty close to eventual "full cost"). 
Shuttle 1994 
1. Shuttle Operations	 $3,375.7 M 
2. STS Capability Development	 $672.5 M 
3. Shuttle Production and Operations Capability 	 $925.2 M 
SUM = $4,973.4 M 
It's important to understand that items 2 and 3 above, while non-recurring development items, were continuously 
funded in one form or another throughout the Shuttle's lifetime (the name changing constantly as well). The actual 
recurring yearly production and operations are in line item 1 (line item 3 naming being a misnomer at that time). 
Considering the Saturn costs from above, but translated to comparable 1994 dollars, would yield values for the 
Saturn Apollo's four lunar launches per year of $9.596B1yr, or $2.4B/launch using just the 1969 budget. Compare 
this to the Shuttle's 1994 value of $4.9B/yr. for seven launches or $0.7B/launch. 
The differences to reconcile in such comparisons become launch rate; i.e., Shuttle's demonstrated seven flight 
per year delivery rate (1992 through 1997) vs. Saturn-Apollo's three launches-per-year capability, the potential 
learning curve that Saturn-Apollo production and operations would have seen had it operated for a couple of 
decades, an effect seen in Shuttle as positive, and the qualitative value of two trips to the Moon, and obtaining lunar 
rock samples vs. the qualitative value of more flights to Low-Earth-Orbit (LEO) and the Shuttle's in-orbit flexibility. 
' Using the NASA New Start Inflation Index, http:!/cost.isc.nasa. gov/inflation!nasa/inflateNASA.html,  a better 
adjustment than the Consumer Price Index (CPI) per se as it accounts better for the lack of mass production 
advances which have driven down the CPI over time. 
8 http://en.wikipedia.org/wilci/NASA
 Budget
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To mitigate these differences in a comparison one mus't return to the main issue at hand, the expendable nature of 
one system vs. the semi-reusable nature of the other. Essentially one equivalency possible in comparing a Saturn 
Apollo to a Shuttle is that mass placed in LEO. In so far as the Saturn Apollo placed an S-IVB third stage into orbit 
along with an instrument unit, a command module and a service module, and a lunar lander, the total weights 
inserted into Earth orbit (gross) would be'°: 
Saturn Apollo: 
Sly-B	 170,000 lb 
Instrument Unit	 4,400 lb 
Command / Service Module	 66,871 lb 
Lunar Lander	 32,399 lb 
Total = 273,670 lb 
X 3 Launches per year = 821,010lb / year 
(plus 3 X 3 crew X 7 day missions = 63 crew days in space per year) 
Plus - usable "cargo" - fractional, as returned lunar samples, small instrument packages 
Shuttle 
Shuttle Orbiter	 240,000 lb (gross lift-off weight) 
Payload	 55,240 lb 
Total= 295,240 lb 
X 7 Launches per year = 2,066,880lb / year 
(plus 7 X 7 crew X 14 day missions = 686 crew days in space per year) 
Plus - usable "cargo" - 55,000 lbs/launch, and in-orbit servicing, assembly and retrieval flexibility 
It becomes clearer from the prior metrics then that in a sense the Shuttle did advance many metrics vs. Saturn 
Apollo, even on a cost basis, depending on the value judgment of lunar missions vs. in-orbit operations, but costs 
were not advanced as much as promised by the holy grail of (semi) reusability. Supposing the Saturn Apollo 
continuation cost at a value close to Shuttle's 1994 cost, that is both in the range of $5B a year (1994 dollars) one 
would still have to consider the budget viability or "affordability" of the "scenarios" as follow: 
Scenarios - 
• Continue Saturn Apollo 
• Funding to launch the other 5? payloads 
or
• Shuttle 
• Funding to launch the other 7 payloads
$5B/year (1994 dollars, content=2 LPY to the Moon) 
$Unknown amount, likely significant 
$5B/year (1994 dollars, content=7 LPY to LEO) 
$Included in above 
It is above (putting aside only the value judgment of "lunar" scientific return vs. "LEO" scientific return) that it's 
seen that the Shuttle was more clearly an advance over Saturn Apollo, in terms of budgetary "affordability", on a 
recurring basis for human space flight, not just a matter of costing less to do less. While improving on affordability 
there were in Shuttle also simultaneous steps to further the technology of reusability, albeit with success and failure 
and much still to learn. Yet the goal of reusability as a "how" for affordability was tied to the basic notion that 
throwaway hardware offered no clear path for furthering the long term affordability of human access to space. This 
brings us to lessons learned and what Shuttle did show about reusability for a next generation wishing to simply 
make access to space increasingly more affordable and routine with every system that evolved. The former - making 
10 All weight values from the applicable "wild" on that element, URL at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page  
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human access to space increasingly more affordable and routine - are aspects that an expendable system has never 
pretended to focus on as a long term goal. On the value proposition of "lunar" vs. "LEO" the question to also add is 
- at what price (or value proposition) do we place knowledge of reusable space planes? 
LII. Shuttle Design Lessons Learned 
There are three key categories under which the most valuable technical lessons can be summarized for the Space 
Shuttle as related to affordability. These are complexity, reliability and maintainability. 
Complexity: This metric is indicated by the number of parts, sub-systems, systems, or flight elements. It can be 
considered as "how much" of something has been designed into the launch vehicle or spacecraft in order to meet the 
functionality desired. 
Reliability: This metric applies best at the component level. Reliability here refers to the probability a part will 
behave as required when tested, used, operated, powered, etc. Health can be detected at any time there is some 
visibility into the parts health. Even when a system has dual or triple redundancy a failure (or even a suspect 
condition) detected in one part will require action, either further test or often removal and replacement. Therefore, as 
complexity (parts count) increases, even when applied as a redundancy to increase system level reliability in flight, 
the actions required on the ground during processing are additive rather than multiplicative. This adversely affects 
affordability and system weight. 
Maintainabifity: This metric is a measure of how easily a part, sub-system, system or element flows through the 
processes required to prepare and launch. It is a measure of labor intensiveness of the design. It is a measure of 
smarts, the ability to quickly test or diagnose, as well as design, such as ease of access to accomplish work, as well 
as of operability, as in ease of handling and servicing. Toxic fluids, for example, make working with a design 
difficult, by needing special gear and suits for workers, as well as making servicing difficult, if there is a leak, or 
merely as added safety precautions. 
All these metrics can interact. If there are four tanks with a toxic fluid using low reliability (but redundant) valves 
here or there, then all other things being equal, the system is (a) more complex than a system with two tanks, (b) less 
reliable than a system where the valves had undergone more rigorous test-fail-fix cycles and (c) less operable than a 
system with a more benign fluid. 
The Space Propulsion Synergy Team (SPST) has previously developed excellent examples of these lessons from 
Shuttle, on the need to focus on simplicity, reducing parts count, such as by improved functional systems 
integration, on the need to improve reliability, such as through robustness, and on the need for improved operability, 
such as by employing non-toxic systems. 
The key technical "hows" arising from the Space Shuttle to improve on a future reusable launch vehicle are 
routinely repeated. A next generation concept must address some principal design and development "musts" as 
follows": 
1. Fewer separate vehicle propulsion systems (engines, thrusters, tanks, fluids, controls, actuators, etc). 
2. Fewer engines total 
3. Fewer tanks total 
4. Fewer ground to flight interfaces 
5. Greater automation in test and checkout 
6. Fewer closed compartments and associated purges 
7. Fewer unique fluids; increase the commonality of physical tanks and any fluids used across distinct functions, 
e.g., orbital maneuvering same as main propulsion 
8. Increase reliability through assorted strategies, including, but not limited to, robustness, significantly separating 
the operating conditions from the variance possible, adding margin, or by more test-fail-fix / re-design cycles 
early in design development. 
"Space Transportation Systems Life Cycle Cost Assessment and Control, AIAA/ASME/SAE/ASEE Joint 
Propulsion Conference, 20-23 July 2008
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Figure 2 
The later point on reliability is well known, yet the relation to the issue of volumes of production is often 
neglected. Consider that the lesson of Shuttle on reliability says "make it more reliable" - which is hardly worth 
noting. This is a trivial observation. The real lesson may lie in asking - why does the Shuttle have the reliability 
problems in ground processing that are reflected in data? One notion relates the lesson of reliability to that of 
simplicity as shown in Figure 2. To save upfront funding, parts with low individual reliability can be ganged to get a 
multiplicative redundancy benefit to systems reliability. The improvement in flight reliability occurs but there is, as 
in the example, 15 X times more likely hardware change-out on the ground (the sum of 1/20+1/20+1/20=3/20 
divided by 1/100). If the system on the left of the figure had only two parts of 1/100 reliability in dual redundant 
mode the flight reliability would be 1/10,000 and have one less component than the triple redundant system to the 
right. Yet the ground operations perspective would be that the reliability burden was merely 13% of the triple 
redundant system with low reliability components (the sum of 1/100+1/100=2/100 vs. the 3/20). 
Alternately a reliability strategy could add margin to a given design with fewer test / fail / fix cycles so as to still 
save up-front costs. Variance would be high but could in theory be tolerated well at reliabilities higher than current 
approaches with low margin. Figure 3 shows this relationship. 
All this begs the question - "why has this lesson not received the attention on the solution that it deserves 
considering the promising benefit to affordability and safety?" Further in depth work is required in this area to 
address possible or perceived barriers such as (a) rocket equation limits, physics and all rationale against such 
reliability improvement that falls in the category of "it weighs too much" and (b) volumes of production which 
relate to national space transportation system goals. 
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IV. Shuttle Programmatic ("Management" and "Leadership") Lessons Learned 
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Cost Control 
A principal lesson learned from the Space Shuttle in the area of management and leadership has to do with cost 
control across a life cycle. That which is not a focus can not be expected to be a controlled result. In an engineering 
and science driven organization the culture will, more often than not, push cost considerations into a realm between 
the neglected and the reactionary. Cost control becomes reactionary to the degree that it does not drive the vehicle or 
ground system design, these decisions being made with nearly all weight falling to performance requirements, near 
term costs (if any costs are emphasized), and rocket system weight considerations. This later reactionary method is 
what pushes off ever developing a smart vehicle (remove weight from onboard, push costs into the future as 
operations). This reactionary system is what results in an unaffordable system on a recurring basis, as the emphasis 
was up-front costs and the "sell" and the "get there". In addition the degree to which cost control is neglected means 
that the process of cost control is relegated to a budgetary process, a reporting process (such as Earned Value 
Management, EVM) or an assessment process (such as review boards, independent or otherwise). None of these are 
effective "control" processes that can change a design based on a future outcome of production, manufacturing or 
operations cost. 
For this single area leadership is crucial as it is only leadership that can intervene to put an end to dysfunctional 
budgetary processes that are essentially dishonest and delusional. Current dynamics favor all things being optimistic 
and unrealistic when a program wishes to get started but making all such programs heavy and expensive once they 
get going. Only a leadership that refuses to partake of such a process can divert energies into more functional, 
credible and productive planning with expectations across all stakeholders, internal or external (Congress, the Office 
of Management and Budget (0MB), the Whitehouse and the scientific community) that are healthy and effective. 
Supply Chain Management 
A second crucial lesson in management derived from the Shuttle comes from observing the Space Shuttle 
extended supply chain. That is the series of practices, processes and technology that use information to enable the 
flow of physical material. This flow of information is intrinsic to the materials flow. Work in this area has developed 
preliminary simulations and the data effort involved has shown tremendous potential for reducing costs' 2 across the 
functional areas that support the production, manufacture, assembly/integration, launch and mission/flight 
operations of a space transportation system. This issue goes to the heart of a healthy industrial base as well'3. 
Simply put the process by which a document is generated, controlled, changed, scheduled, called up and 
eventually marked as containing completed requirements is a function of the system composed of practices 
(guidance, policy), processes (steps, people) and technology (software etc). Examples like this abound in both the 
contractor world as well as in government operations. These "in-direct" functions from contractor configuration 
control: scheduling, document generation, work control, requirements management, problem reporting, engineering 
drawings, change processes, etc.; to government configuration control: finance, procurement, drawings, human 
resources, engineering, etc. add up to significant percents (up to 50% at total levels) of complex operations such as 
the Space Shuttle. Left to themselves they will likely again be significant costs in any future system as legacy 
practices, processes and technology transfer to new systems without any understanding of the eventual costs. 
Applying modern supply chain practices, even at low aerospace volumes, would mean first, understand, and 
second, control these in-direct costs. This crucial lesson falls in the category of low-hanging-fruit. 
V. Human Space Flight Strategic Lessons Learned 
There are various lessons from Shuttle that fall into the category of the strategic that are lessons for NASA as a 
whole and the space industry of which NASA is a part. 
Strategic Lesson 1: Make sure it adds up long term by assuring recurring costs, such as for space transportation, 
do not consume future plans. When a space transportation system is developed and flies, such a success should not 
be considered strategic off-hand. It may be a tactical success and a strategic failure. In this sense the Shuttle 
experience has mixed results. Tactically the Shuttle was a success, a long lived system that served this nation for 
12 
"Making the Case for a NASA Advanced Supply Chain Management Initiative", (2008), Zapata, E., NASA 
Kennedy Space Center. Also at: http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/nexgen/Making  Case SCM.htm 
13 "Counting the Links in the Supply Chain", NASA Rendezvous Magazine, (2008), Galluzzi, M., NASA Kennedy 
Space Center and Bujewski, T., The Aerospace Corporation. Also at: 
http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/nexgen/SCM Galluzzi Bujewski.htm 
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three decades. Strategically it was a success in the sense that it enabled a Space Station and a human presence in 
space, making the notion of humans in space continuously a customary notion, a normal expectation. Alternately 
the system was a strategic failure to the degree its high recurring costs consumed many future plans. As shown in 
Figure 4 there were many plans' 4 for what was to come once an affordable Shuttle was operational. Note the way the 
Shuttle budget rises and then drops in the figure, a behavior that actually became a peak followed by a steady and at 
times increasing yearly cost. 
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On the matter of Lesson 1 it is important to note that the new Constellation program sees this issue and references 
in assorted documents the need to have an "operations costs ... sufficiently low to permit the simultaneous operation 
of near-term systems and the development of ongoing lunar and Mars systems." But also worth noting, Constellation 
does not show a "drop" once operations in 2020 begin with both the planned crew and cargo vehicles 
simultaneously. Observe the picture of events' 5 in Figure 5, noting that the peak funds planned in 2017 do not (a) 
significantly drop after that and (b) are nearly twice, even in inflation adjusted terms, the current Shuttle space 
transportation allocated recurring yearly budget. 
Strategic Lesson 2: Encourage competition explicitly, backed by funds, policy or lawmaking, rather than 
sponsoring government or private sector monopolies. The matter here may sound odd. Multiple companies large and 
small (Lockheed-Martin, Boeing, Space X, etc) compete for dollars. To understand this issue the question will be 
phrased differently - 
• Do we allow manufacturers of passenger jet aircraft (such as Boeing) to sell only to themselves (as airline 
operators) to deliver mostly government employees and cargo? 
The actual answer is yes, once we did, in the past. Anti-trust legislation, recognizing this was not a good 
arrangement (i.e., Boeing and United Airlines) put an end to this to encourage the growth of air travel. Multiple 
operators could then buy airplanes and more importantly encourage safety, affordability and reliability by competing 
one manufacturer against another. The operators could walk away from concepts that benefitted manufacturers only 
(such as by needing extensive overhaul, parts and related support). Operators could vote with their money and their 
feet. 
14 Report of the Space Task Group-1969, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, Wash,, 
D.C. 
' "Visualizing the Generational Advance of NASA and Space Exploration", NASA Cost Symposium, (2008), 
Zapata, E., NASA Kennedy Space Center 
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Figure 5 
This strategic lesson of competition has been documented befor& 6 as both an operator issue and an acquisition 
issue, but it is also a policy issue at the National level. It is not inconceivable that at some future time a breakup of 
the major players encourages manufacturers to sell to any operators (such as NASA, or any other private company, 
perhaps even internationally) while also making it illegal for the manufacturers of rockets and spacecraft to operate 
these same systems. Such a breakup, akin to the breakup of "Ma'Be11 17", could encourage competitiveness in ways 
never before imagined as happened with telephony breaking a path into the age of the internet. 
VI. National Goal Setting Lessons Learned 
The prior sum of technical, management and leadership, and strategic and policy lessons all ultimately come face 
to face with the matter of National goals in the human exploration of space. Is access to space and space exploration, 
robotic, human or otherwise, to be a government sponsored enterprise as far as the eye can see? While the goal of 
becoming a space-faring civilization is generally accepted in any conversation among most space community 
stakeholders it is not as easily backed by actions consistent with the widespread proliferation of launch vehicles and 
spacecraft. "Proliferation" is in fact an undesirable outcome in many a space community circle. To address the 
technical issue of volumes of production, which relate to reliability, reducing complexity, creating knowledge and 
learning of what is operable and what is not, and thus to furthering affordability, a very basic question must be 
addressed. Is a healthy and growing access to space, leading to many hundreds of launches per year and costs that 
add players rather then exclude them, truly at odds with a world that is safe from space systems as weapons? 
Notably, the sale of airliners, cars, trains and all level of advanced technology from the United States to the rest of 
the world are usually encouraged. It is understood that having a product does not of necessity surrender all 
knowledge of how to make the product. 
None of this can come about without expanded Research and Development (R&D), which, ironically, is best 
funded when operable systems allow it to be funded at the levels that lead to actual systems level knowledge. This 
R&D would feed a development program focused on recurring affordability, creating a virtuous cycle from which 
16 
"Independent Space Transportation Operator Concept, A Breakthrough Acquisition Strategy Using Independent 
Space Transportation Operators, Making Affordable and Sustainable Space Transportation Possible", C. McCleskey, 
Systems Engineering Office, Spaceport Engineering & Technology Directorate, NASA John F. Kennedy Space 
Center, Florida, May 18, 2004. Also at: http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/nexgenlspace  trans afford main.htm 
17 Bell System divestiture, Wiki at: http ://en.wikipedia.org/wikilBell System_divestiture 
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aerospace can escape from the prevailing chicken-and-the-egg syndromes of short term decision creating inoperable 
systems that neglect lessons and which then pressure future R&D and developments budgets. 
Without addressing this matter of our National goals most other matters of lessons expressed here will be correct, 
but woefully underutilized in most any scenario - with the exception of technology surprises or disruptions as 
knowledge spreads, nonetheless.
VII. Conclusions 
There are tangible, achievable technical, management and leadership, and strategic and policy lessons that can 
and must be executed in any next generation space transportation system. These are realities by which any program 
will either succeed or fail. These are independent of funding as they are about what to do once funding is available, 
"how to think" at least, even in a constrained budget environment, or measures by which outcomes can be seen and 
planned around. The following technical, management and leadership, and strategic lessons learned conclusions are 
presented as what should be done versus what has been done in the past. 
Technical
(a) Expendable hardware production costs appear to require a higher operational budget to sustain 
than reusable systems (Apollo vs. Shuttle program comparison). 
(b) Simplification by Functional Integration vs. Complexity by Decomposition 
(c) Reliability that's Inherently Safer vs. Redundancy for Flight (perform design corrective action 
with more extensive test / fail I fix cycles in order to lower the recurring operations cost) 
(d) Maintainability (Operability) vs. Development-Near-Term Focused Design Decisions 
Management, Leadership 
(a) Cost Control vs. Cost Assessment 
(b) Design the Extended Supply Chain Alongside the System vs. Just Seeing Flight Hardware 
Strategic Lessons Learned 
(a) Having a Long View, Doing Strategic Planning, vs. Cannibalizing Future Programs 
(b) Policy: Assure Competition vs. Competing the Acquisition of Monopolies 
Examining the Shuttle shortfalls also leads to conclusions about the goals that should be pursued in the future. 
• National Goals 
(a) A Healthy R&D level, infusing a Healthy Developmental Capability, Handing off to Operations 
(b) Volume, Growing an Industrial Base, Spreading Knowledge 
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